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POLICE CHECKPOINTS: LACK OF
GUIDANCE FROM THE SUPREME COURT
CONTRIBUTES TO DISREGARD OF CIVIL
LIBERTIES IN THE DISTRICT OF
COLUMBIA
JASON FIEBIG∗
Without drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general
interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such
1
intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life.

During the summer of 2008, crime in the Trinidad neighborhood of the
District of Columbia was at an all time high and, in the eyes of top law
enforcement brass, was only getting worse. In response to the rising crime
rate, city leadership authorized a wide variety of law enforcement sweeps in
the area, all of which proved ineffective. Reluctantly, the decision was
made to set up police checkpoints around the neighborhood.
The constitutionality of the police checkpoints was challenged in
federal court that summer. Despite a favorable ruling in district court, the
United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the militarystyle checkpoints set up to combat the city’s gun violence problem were
unconstitutional. The appellate court found that the city’s administrators
had ignored Supreme Court guidance that has limited when, where, and
how police checkpoints may be used in a manner consistent with the
Constitution.

∗

J.D., Northwestern University School of Law, 2010; B.S.F.S., Georgetown University,
Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service, 2005. I would like to thank the editors of the
Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, and in particular Kristen Jones, for assistance,
insight, and guidance throughout the drafting and revision process. I would also like to
thank William, Pauline, Marilee, Chantale, and Rebecca, for their unwavering
encouragement and support.
1
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 42 (2000).

599

600

Jason Fiebig

[Vol. 100

This Comment argues that the Supreme Court has failed to provide the
type of guidance necessary to ensure that officials in high-crime areas
refrain from instituting unconstitutional police checkpoints in the face of
increased criminal activity. The Supreme Court’s guidance regarding
police checkpoints has been sufficiently vague to encourage city
administrators to authorize checkpoints of questionable legality in the face
of rising crime. Accordingly, the protections of the Fourth Amendment in
cities across the United States are at risk.

I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine armed police officers surrounding your neighborhood and
pulling over every approaching vehicle without any individualized
suspicion of guilt. Each driver is questioned regarding his purpose in
driving into the neighborhood. Each driver is also forced to disclose the
contact information of his friends, family, and associates in the
neighborhood—information that is then verified and entered into a police
database. Only those drivers who the police deem as having a legitimate
purpose for entering the neighborhood are allowed to continue on to their
final destination. For those who fail to comply, a local jail cell awaits.
If you live in an area of the United States where the crime rates are
high or rapidly rising, such tactics may soon find a place in a neighborhood
near you. In the summer of 2008, the leaders of one major American city
authorized the enforcement of such tactics—tactics that one more
commonly associates with military zones in war-torn cities like Baghdad
and Kabul. The American city that instituted these tactics, which were
considered essential elements of a police checkpoint program authorized by
city officials, serves as the capital of the United States: Washington, D.C.
The first U.S. court that considered the constitutionality of these
checkpoints found them reasonable and justifiable under the Constitution.2
More recently, a panel of judges on the United States Court of Appeals for
the D.C. Circuit held that the checkpoints are, in fact, unconstitutional.3
In their opinions, both the district and appellate courts analyzed the
constitutionality of Washington’s police checkpoints by applying tests
created by the Supreme Court. While this Comment argues that the D.C.
Circuit’s proper application of the tests resulted in the correct conclusion, it
acknowledges that the current tests advocated by the Supreme Court make
that conclusion debatable. However, this conclusion should not be up for
debate and would not be if the Supreme Court modified or replaced its
2
3

Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2008).
Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills II), 571 F.3d 1304 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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current, deeply flawed tests for assessing the constitutionality of police
checkpoints.
A. FACTUAL OVERVIEW OF THE D.C. POLICE CHECKPOINTS

In the summer of 2008, the District of Columbia Metropolitan Police
Department (MPD) established Neighborhood Safety Zones (NSZ) to
combat the city’s growing gun violence problem.4 The District’s top brass
had decided that enough was enough, particularly in the Northeast
neighborhood known as Trinidad.5 In the preceding year, the neighborhood
had witnessed an inordinate amount of violence involving firearms.6
Several of these incidents resulted in homicides and as many as six
involved the use of automobiles.7
On June 7, 2008, in response to the aforementioned events and a triple
homicide involving a juvenile victim that took place on May 31, 2008, the
MPD, under the authorization of Special Police Order SO-08-06, designated
a portion of Trinidad as an NSZ.8 The MPD installed eleven vehicle
checkpoints over the course of five days at locations around the zone’s
perimeter.9
According to an article in the Washington Post, the checkpoints would
stop vehicles approaching the 1400 block of Montello Avenue NE, a section of the
Trinidad neighborhood that has been plagued with homicides and other violence.
Police [would] search cars if they [suspected] the presence of guns or drugs, and
[would] arrest people who [did] not cooperate, under a charge of failure to obey a
10
police officer . . . .

In addition, vehicles were only allowed to enter the Trinidad neighborhood
if police officers determined, after questioning the driver, that he had a
“legitimate purpose” for entering the NSZ.11 The checkpoints were to be
enforced at random hours for at least five days, though they could be
extended to ten days according to the police under Special Order
SO-08-06.12

4

David C. Lipscomb, Police to ID Drivers in 5th District, WASH. TIMES, June 5, 2008, at

A1.
5

Id.
Id.
7
Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 50.
8
Id. at 50-51.
9
Id.
10
Allison Klein, D.C. Police to Check Drivers in Violence-Plagued Trinidad, WASH.
POST, June 5, 2008, at A14.
11
Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 51.
12
Id. at 50.
6
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The Special Order, which governed the conduct of the officers
conducting the checkpoints, listed a variety of “legitimate” reasons for
entry.13 MPD officers staffing the checkpoints stopped 951 vehicles and
denied entry to 48 on account of either the operator’s failure or refusal to
provide a “legitimate reason” for entry.14 The MPD officers were
authorized to request identification and proof of the reason for entry in
order to “‘verify the accuracy of the reason.’”15 Failure to provide a
“legitimate reason” was not a criminal offense in itself, and those who were
denied entry or that chose not to provide it were allowed to park their cars
and enter the NSZ on foot.16 For vehicles denied entry into Trinidad,
officers were instructed to record the “operator information, vehicle
description, vehicle tag number, and reason for denial.”17 Even for vehicles
granted entry, officers were instructed to record the tag number and reason
for entry.18 The District has admitted that much of this information was
entered into a law enforcement database, for reasons unknown as of this
point.19
On July 18, 2008, the MPD issued a revised Special Order regarding
the NSZ.20 The core aspects of the program and procedures were not
changed.21 However, the revised Special Order required that no data
gathered at NSZ checkpoints from that point on was to be entered into any
District of Columbia law enforcement electronic database.22
The following day, July 19, 2008, Chief of Police Cathy Lanier
authorized a second NSZ in Trinidad.23
These checkpoints were
presumably in response to multiple shootings earlier that day by individuals

13

Id. at 51. The Special Order lists the following “legitimate” reasons for entry:

1) The person resides in the NSZ;
2) The person is employed in the NSZ or is on a commercial delivery;
3) The person attends school or a day-care facility, or is taking a child to, or picking up a child
from, a school or day-care facility in the NSZ;
4) The person is a relative of a person who resides in the NSZ;
5) The person is seeking medical attention, is elderly, or is disabled; and/or
6) The person is attempting to attend a verified organized civic, community or religious event
within the NSZ.
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 52.
Id.
Id. The MPD has not revealed its motivation for making this change.
Id.
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allegedly firing from automobiles.24 More than six people were shot,
including a thirteen-year-old boy who later died.25
On July 24, 2008, Chief Lanier extended the second NSZ for five days
in response to information the police had received indicating that further
violence involving automobiles might be imminent.26 Following the
extension, another revised Special Order was issued, but none of the core
aspects of the revised Special Order were materially altered.27
B. THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA’S JUSTIFICATION FOR THE USE OF
POLICE CHECKPOINTS IN TRINIDAD

As mentioned previously, the checkpoints were instituted by the police
in an attempt to combat a spike in the number of homicides in the District,
which rose 7% in 2007 after several years of decline.28 Chief Lanier noted
that the checkpoints “served as a fence to keep violent criminals out of
Trinidad” rather than as “nets to capture evidence of ordinary criminal
wrongdoing.”29 City officials downplayed the significance of the initiative,
noting that the MPD had used various checkpoints in the past.30 In fact,
while the use of checkpoints to surround a neighborhood was a new policy,
the MPD had maintained a long-standing practice of using police
checkpoints (referred to as roadblocks) for the purposes of general crime
control and data collection.31
Responding to the threat of a potential legal challenge to the
checkpoints, Interim D.C. Attorney General Peter Nickles cited a New York
case he believed provided legal support for the checkpoints, Maxwell v. City
of New York.32 In Maxwell, New York City police were authorized to stop
motorists in the Bronx at random hours, mostly in the evening, to curtail
drive-by shootings, drug trafficking, and robberies.33 Neighborhood
residents and commercial vehicles were allowed to pass while others were
24

Michael Birnbaum, Paul Duggan & Valerie Strauss, Checkpoints Resume After Spate
of Violence, WASH. POST, July 20, 2008, at C1.
25
Id.
26
Elissa Silverman, Trinidad Checkpoints: Anti-Violence Effort to Be Extended, Chief
Says, WASH. POST, July 25, 2008, at B4.
27
Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
28
Allison Klein, Killings in D.C. up After Long Dip, WASH. POST, Jan. 1, 2008, at A1.
29
Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (citing Declaration. of Cathy L. Lanier ¶ 4, June 27,
2008).
30
Brian Westley, Police Plan Car Checkpoints in D.C. Neighborhood, HOUS. CHRON.,
June 6, 2008, at A13.
31
Allan Lengel, Safety Stops Draw Doubts: D.C. Police Gather Nonviolators’ Data,
WASH. POST, May 2, 2005, at B1.
32
102 F.3d 664 (2d Cir. 1996).
33
Id. at 666.

604

Jason Fiebig

[Vol. 100

turned away.34 A federal appeals court ruled in 1996 that those police
tactics were constitutional, saying that the checkpoints were reasonably
viewed as an effective mechanism to reduce drive-by shootings.35
Even with the legal support found in Maxwell, Nickles believed that
the District of Columbia had “gone the extra mile” to make sure that the
roadblocks passed constitutional muster.36 He assured the public that
officials had tried all other reasonable means to stop the killings, including
flooding the area with police officers.37 Yet, on June 20, 2008, the
Partnership for Civil Justice, a Washington-based public interest law firm,
filed a class action lawsuit in the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia seeking an injunction against the MPD’s NSZ
checkpoint program.38
The plaintiffs alleged that the roadblock program instituted by the
MPD authorized unconstitutional suspicionless seizures of persons traveling
on public roadways in the District of Columbia.39 All of the plaintiffs in the
suit, except for one, were denied entry to Trinidad in their vehicles on
account of their refusal to provide certain information.40 On October 30,
2008, Judge Richard Leon of the U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia denied the preliminary injunction request because the plaintiffs
had demonstrated neither a substantial likelihood that the checkpoint
program was unconstitutional nor the necessary irreparable harm.41
On July 10, 2009, approximately one year after the installation of the
first set of NSZ checkpoints, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
district court and granted a preliminary injunction on the basis that the
Trinidad checkpoints were likely to be held unconstitutional.42
C. WOULD THE SUPREME COURT AGREE?

It is difficult to determine whether the Supreme Court would agree
with the opinions of the district court or the D.C. Circuit regarding the
34

Id.
Id. at 668.
36
Westley, supra note 30, at A13.
37
Id.
38
Del Quentin Wilber, Class Action Filed Over Checkpoints: Rights Group Calls Police
Activity in Trinidad Neighborhood Unconstitutional, WASH. POST, June 21, 2008, at B2.
39
Id.
40
Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 51-52 (D.D.C. 2008). The one plaintiff who was not
denied entry, William Robinson, resided in the Trinidad neighborhood at the time of the
complaint. He, however, alleged that he was told by an officer at a checkpoint that he could
not proceed to his house in his vehicle without providing identity information, which he
refused to do.
41
Id. at 64.
42
See Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills II), 571 F.3d 1304, 1310 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
35
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constitutionality of the NSZ checkpoints. Part II of this Comment explores
how the Supreme Court has dealt in the past with police checkpoint cases
that implicate the Constitution’s Fourth Amendment protections. Part III
considers Judge Leon’s district court opinion refusing to grant a preliminary
injunction prohibiting further use of NSZ checkpoints. This section also
scrutinizes the D.C. Circuit’s opinion, examining how it came to a different
conclusion than the district court.
Finally, Part IV argues that the tests used by the Supreme Court to
judge the constitutionality of police checkpoints are deeply flawed, that the
Court’s current lack of effective guidance poses a substantial risk to the
protections of the Fourth Amendment, and that a new “strict scrutiny” test
should be applied to police checkpoints. Given recent developments in this
area of the law, the Supreme Court must clarify or correct its position. The
fundamental rights of U.S. citizens are at stake.
II. BACKGROUND
The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from unreasonable
government searches and seizures.43 Since the beginning of the twentieth
century, courts have struggled with the question of how to apply the privacy
rights guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to drivers of automobiles.44
This Part examines how the Fourth Amendment has been interpreted by the
Supreme Court as it applies to automobile searches and seizures,
specifically when they occur at police checkpoints.
A. DISCRETIONARY STOPS BY THE POLICE UNDER THE FOURTH
AMENDMENT

The Supreme Court has consistently held that, when a vehicle is
stopped at a police checkpoint and the vehicle’s passengers are detained, a
“seizure” under the Fourth Amendment occurs.45 The result is the same
even when the stop is limited in purpose or brief in duration.46
43

U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .”).
44
See David A. Harris, Car Wars: The Fourth Amendment’s Death on the Highway, 66
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 556, 565-66 (1998).
45
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000) (“It is well established
that a vehicle stop at a highway checkpoint effectuates a seizure within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.”); Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 450 (1990) (“[A]
Fourth Amendment ‘seizure’ occurs when a vehicle is stopped at a checkpoint.”); United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556 (1976) (“[C]heckpoint stops are ‘seizures’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”).
46
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975) (“The Fourth Amendment
applies to all seizures of the person, including seizures that involve only a brief detention
short of traditional arrest.”).
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In Delaware v. Prouse, the Supreme Court considered whether
discretionary stops by individual patrolmen were constitutional.47 A
patrolman pulled over a driver to check his license and registration without
observing a traffic violation or suspecting other illegal activity.48 The Court
held that unless definite suspicion exists that a driver has committed an
unlawful act, stopping a vehicle and detaining a driver for the purpose of
checking his license and registration violates the Fourth Amendment.49 The
Court concluded that the danger of a patrolman abusing his discretion is
greater than any marginal benefit the stops might produce for roadway
safety.50 This conclusion was consistent with the Fourth Amendment
bedrock principle that no seizure should occur without individualized
suspicion of criminal wrongdoing.
Despite the Prouse Court’s articulation that the Fourth Amendment
demands individualized suspicion to conduct a seizure, over the years the
United States Supreme Court has carved out several exceptions to the
individualized suspicion requirement.
B. THE FIRST EXCEPTION: BORDER PATROL CHECKPOINTS

United States v. Martinez-Fuerte is the seminal police checkpoint case
that began the carving out of exceptions to the individualized suspicion
requirement of the Fourth Amendment in order to facilitate automotiverelated crime control.51 In Martinez-Fuerte, the defendants were drivers of
automobiles stopped at permanent checkpoints set up along roads that led
away from the U.S.-Mexico border.52 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
because the Courts of Appeals for the Fifth and Ninth Circuits were in
conflict regarding the constitutionality of the use of checkpoints to police
the nation’s borders.53
The checkpoints were located on thoroughfares frequently traveled by
vehicles coming from the border.54 Each vehicle was inspected, and those
drivers that, as determined by the police, required additional inquiry were
pulled out of traffic.55 Each of the original defendants in Martinez-Fuerte

47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

440 U.S. 648 (1979).
Id. at 650.
Id. at 663.
Id.
428 U.S. 543 (1976).
Id. at 546-47.
Id. at 551.
Id. at 546.
Id.
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had been arrested for transporting illegal aliens, which in each instance had
been discovered upon further inquiry at the checkpoint.56
After reviewing the facts, the Supreme Court held that routine stops at
permanent border checkpoints are consistent with the Fourth Amendment.57
The decision was significant given that the Court had consistently held in
the past that checkpoint searches are constitutional only if justified by
consent or probable cause.58 The Court held that the need to make routine
checkpoint stops near borders is great, particularly in light of the flow of
illegal aliens and drug smuggling across the Mexican border.59 The Court
also noted that the intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests is limited.60
The Court’s majority recognized the dissent’s concern that the decision
might erode Fourth Amendment protections as envisioned by the Framers.61
Accordingly, the holding in Martinez-Fuerte is limited to border control
checkpoints.62
C. THE BROWN REASONABLENESS TEST

Three years after Martinez-Fuerte, the Court faced another Fourth
Amendment case that would prove highly influential for years to come,
particularly in the realm of police checkpoint jurisprudence. In Brown v.
Texas, two police officers spotted the defendant as he walked away from
another man in an alley.63 The police officers admitted that they did not
suspect him of any specific misconduct.64 Regardless, they stopped the
defendant and demanded that he identify himself and explain what he had
been doing in the alley.65 The defendant refused to cooperate and was
arrested.66

56

Id. at 546-50.
Id. at 566-67.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 555-56.
60
Id. at 558 (noting that the stops involved only a “brief detention of travelers during
which ‘all that [was] required of the vehicle’s occupants [was] a response to a brief question
or two and possibly the production of a document evidencing a right to be in the United
States’”).
61
Id. at 567 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision is the ninth Term marking the
continuing evisceration of Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and
seizures.”).
62
Id.
63
443 U.S. 47, 48-49 (1979).
64
Id. at 49.
65
Id. at 48-49.
66
Id. at 49.
57
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The defendant claimed that his seizure violated his Fourth Amendment
rights.67 The Court considered whether it was reasonable for police to seize
an individual absent individualized suspicion of criminal activity. The
Court developed a test that weighed “the gravity of the public concerns
served by the seizure, the degree to which the seizure advances the public
interest, and the severity of the interference with individual liberty.”68 The
Court found that the public interest concerns in preventing crime are great,
but the concerns are not great enough to demand that an individual identify
himself when he is not suspected of committing a crime.69 The Brown test
has since been relied upon by the U.S. Supreme Court in almost every
major ruling regarding police checkpoints.70
D. THE SECOND EXCEPTION: SOBRIETY CHECKPOINTS

The next major Supreme Court police checkpoint case was Michigan
Department of State Police v. Sitz.71 In Sitz, the Supreme Court considered
whether Michigan’s use of sobriety checkpoints violated the Fourth
Amendment.72 The sobriety checkpoints were set up at selected sites along
state roads, and officers would briefly stop all vehicles that passed in order
to examine the drivers for signs of intoxication.73 If signs of intoxication
were detected, then, as in the checkpoint in Martinez-Fuerte, the cars would
be taken out of traffic for further inspection.74 Typically, the police
inspected the driver’s license and registration and, if necessary, conducted
additional sobriety tests.75
The case came to the Supreme Court after motorists filed a complaint
in Michigan courts against the state police department alleging that
checkpoints conducted with the purpose of combating drunk driving violate
the Fourth Amendment.76 Relying on the Brown reasonableness test, which
requires courts to weigh the public concern against the severity of the
intrusion, the majority in Sitz upheld the sobriety checkpoints as
constitutional.77 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a sharply divided
67

Id.
Id. at 51.
69
Id. at 52.
70
See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster (Lidster IV), 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004); Mich. Dep’t of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
71
496 U.S. at 444.
72
Id. at 447.
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id. at 448.
77
Id. at 455.
68
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Court, held that a sobriety checkpoint is justified. The Court reasoned that
the state’s interest in preventing drunk driving, and the extent to which the
checkpoint program could reasonably be found to advance that interest,
outweighs the minimal degree of intrusion upon motorists who are briefly
stopped.78
E. GENERAL CRIME CONTROL POLICE CHECKPOINTS: THE
INTRODUCTION OF THE PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST

In a somewhat surprising decision, given the Supreme Court’s
holdings in Martinez-Fuerte and Sitz, the Court placed a limitation upon
police checkpoints in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.79 In Edmond, the
Court dealt with a challenge to Indianapolis’s use of vehicle checkpoints to
search automobiles for drugs.80 City officials were worried that motorists
were bringing narcotics into Indianapolis.81 They hoped that police
checkpoints would prove more effective in curbing narcotics trafficking
than the prior techniques relied upon by city officers.82 The officials
figured that they could set up reasonable checkpoints to deal with their drug
problem that would pass constitutional muster, much like earlier Courtapproved checkpoints that had dealt with the problems of drunk driving and
illegal immigration.83
The Indianapolis Police Department adopted very specific guidelines
that were to be followed by police officers administering the checkpoints.84
The vehicle checkpoints were manned with approximately thirty police
officers.85 The officers would pull over a group of passing cars for
inspection, and the rest of the traffic on the road would proceed as usual.86
Officers would approach each vehicle, inform the driver that he had been
stopped at a drug checkpoint, and ask for his driver’s license and
registration.87 The officer would check for impairment and conduct a visual
inspection from outside the car.88 A narcotics dog would also walk around

78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
531 U.S. 32 (2000).
Id. at 34.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 34-36.
Id. at 35.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the vehicle.89 Any further inspection before letting the driver go would
require consent or particularized suspicion.90
In Edmond, the Court framed the dispositive issue as being whether
highway checkpoints with the “primary purpose” of discovery and
interdiction of vehicle passengers possessing illegal narcotics are
constitutional.91 In an opinion delivered by Justice O’Connor, the Court
noted that it was unwilling to limit the purposes that might justify a
checkpoint program to any “rigid set of categories.”92 The Court, however,
also concluded that it could not approve a program whose “primary
purpose” is indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control.93
The Court noted that, in the previous instances in which the Fourth
Amendment particularized-suspicion requirement was suspended, the
primary purpose of the checkpoints was closely tailored to the specific
problems of patrolling the border or maintaining safe highways.94 The
Court found that in Edmond, the purpose of “drug interdiction” was too
closely related to Indianapolis’s general interest in crime control and the
city’s checkpoints organized under this purpose required individualized
suspicion in order to be constitutional.95
F. ILLINOIS V. LIDSTER: THE LATEST SUPREME COURT CASE TO
CONSIDER POLICE CHECKPOINTS

In Illinois v. Lidster, the Supreme Court faced another police
checkpoint dilemma.96 In this case, however, the police officers were not
stopping cars in order to detect or deter criminal wrongdoing by the drivers
themselves; instead, officers were stopping cars for the sole purpose of
obtaining information about a hit-and-run driver on the loose.97 Joseph
Pytel was hit and killed by a car while riding his bike in August 1997, and
the driver of the vehicle that hit him left the scene without identifying
himself.98 Two days after the accident, the local police had no leads. In an

89

Id.
Id.
91
Id. at 40.
92
Id. at 44.
93
Id. at 44.
94
Id. at 41.
95
Id. at 48.
96
540 U.S. 419 (2004).
97
Id. at 421.
98
William Grady, Obituaries, Joseph L. Pytel, 70, Postal Worker, CHI. TRIB., Aug. 25,
1997, at 5.
90
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effort to obtain more information about the driver, police set up the
checkpoints in question.99
Robert Lidster was the manager of a local pet store who was not
involved in and had no material knowledge regarding Pytel’s accident.100
Lidster did, however, encounter the checkpoint while driving under the
influence. After being briefly questioned, he nearly hit a police officer
while attempting to drive his car away from the checkpoint.101 Noting
Lidster’s erratic driving, the police officer who had nearly been hit
requested Lidster’s license and registration.102 The officer smelled alcohol
on his breath, had Lidster perform sobriety tests, and subsequently arrested
Lidster for driving under the influence.103
The Court’s decision in this case is particularly interesting considering
the outcomes reached by the two Illinois appellate courts that heard the case
in the wake of the Edmond decision. At the trial court level, Robert Lidster
was convicted by a jury of his peers.104 The Illinois Appellate Court
reversed the conviction, finding that it was “impossible to escape the
conclusion that the roadblock’s ostensible purpose was to seek evidence of
‘ordinary criminal wrongdoing.’”105 The appellate court acknowledged the
possibility that an emergency situation might justify a roadblock for crime
control, but it concluded that this was “the type of routine investigative
work that the police must do every day and does not justify the
extraordinary means chosen to further the investigation.”106 In using the
Brown reasonableness test criteria, the appellate court also concluded that
the public interest in the acquisition of evidence of a prior crime did not
outweigh the intrusion on the rights of innocent motorists.107
The Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court’s ruling. The
Illinois Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the trial court ignored
the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Edmond, which it interpreted as
prohibiting the use of police checkpoints to advance the general interest in
crime control.108 The court reasoned that allowing such informational

99

Lidster IV, 540 U.S. at 422.
Id.
101
Id.
102
Id. at 422.
103
Id.
104
Id. at 421.
105
People v. Lidster (Lidster II), 747 N.E.2d 419, 422 (Ill. App. Ct. 2001).
106
Id.
107
Id. at 421-22.
108
People v. Lidster (Lidster III), 779 N.E.2d 855, 858-59 (Ill. 2002).
100
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roadblocks could potentially make police checkpoints a “routine part of
American life.”109
Justice Breyer wrote the opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court, which
overturned the rulings of the Illinois courts. The Court held that the Fourth
Amendment does not prohibit the use of motorist checkpoints that are
authorized for the purpose of requesting information from vehicle
occupants about a previously committed crime.110 Justice Breyer refused to
accept the lower courts’ conclusion that the checkpoint in Lidster had been
used to prevent “ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” like the checkpoint in
Edmond.
The police checkpoint in question in Lidster was for
informational purposes, not general crime control, which after Edmond
continues to be per se invalid.111
After determining that the “informational” primary purpose of the
Lidster checkpoints is valid under Edmond, the Court moved to the Brown
reasonableness test.112 The Court deemed the stops to be constitutional as
the public interest in solving the crime is great, the methods used by the
police are effective, and these factors outweigh the concern over
interference with individual liberties as a result of the stops.113
III. IN THE WAKE OF THESE DECISIONS: DISCUSSION OF
THE CONSITUTIONALITY OF NEIGHBORHOOD ZONES IN
THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
It is clear that the Supreme Court has not said that police checkpoints
are per se unconstitutional. Various exceptions have been carved out of the
individualized suspicion requirement of the Fourth Amendment in order to
permit police checkpoints that facilitate automotive-related crime control
(such as border checkpoints, sobriety checkpoints, and Lidster-type
informational checkpoints).114 Still, Judge Leon’s district court opinion in
Mills v. District of Columbia, which upheld the D.C. checkpoints, was
startling for its outcome. The facts of the case strongly support a
conclusion that the primary purpose of the checkpoints was to serve the
general interest in crime control. Consequently, like the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals, this Comment argues that his ultimate decision was not faithful
to Supreme Court precedent or the Constitution.

109

Id. at 860.
Illinois v. Lidster (Lidster IV), 540 U.S. 419, 427-28 (2004).
111
Id. at 426.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
See id.; Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
110
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The district court’s decision in Mills is to be commended in one sense:
Judge Leon attempted to apply faithfully the Supreme Court’s tests to the
facts in front of him.115 This is a significant undertaking given that the
Justices of the Supreme Court themselves have been inconsistent in the
application of the tests. Nevertheless, this Comment argues that, because
the primary purpose of the D.C. checkpoints was to serve the “general
interest in crime control,” the district court’s opinion was correctly reversed
on appeal.
A. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF THE D.C. POLICE CHECKPOINTS

A vehicle checkpoint program’s “primary purpose” is a question of
fact that must be assessed at the programmatic level.116 Lower courts have
been cautioned that “finding the primary or predominant purpose will often
prove difficult,” and the courts must take into account all available
evidence.117 Furthermore, courts should not “probe the minds of individual
officers” acting at the checkpoints, but rather they should look beyond the
specific circumstances of any one checkpoint in determining the
“programmatic purpose.”118
In Mills, the district court, in determining the “primary purpose” of the
checkpoints, looked to the Special Orders issued, the Trinidad NSZ
authorizing documents, declarations from Chief Lanier, and the factual
circumstances of the Trinidad checkpoints themselves.119 Judge Leon
dispensed with the argument that the programmatic purpose of the police
checkpoints was to “detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,”
which is per se unconstitutional after Edmond.120 Instead, according to
Judge Leon, the purpose of the checkpoints was not to detect evidence of
criminal wrongdoing but to deter violent crime facilitated by the use of
automobiles.121 This difference in purpose made the D.C. checkpoints
distinguishable from those used in Edmond.122
Accordingly, the primary purpose test in Mills turned on whether a
“primary purpose to deter violent crime of a specific type is sufficiently
distinct from the District’s general interest in crime control.”123 Since the
115

See Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2008).
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
117
Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 55 (citing United States v. Davis, 270 F.3d 977, 979 (D.C.
Cir. 2001)).
118
Id. (citing Edmond, 531 U.S. at 48).
119
Id. at 55-56.
120
Id. at 57.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id. (emphasis added).
116
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primary purpose was “sufficiently distinct” from the District’s general
interest in crime control, the checkpoints were held to be constitutional.124
The court reasoned, “Indeed, because the NSZ checkpoint program
explicitly does not seek to detect ordinary criminal wrongdoing, or
apprehend those committing criminal acts, the program’s primary purpose
is clearly distinct from the District’s ‘general interest in crime control,’ as
that phrase was employed in Edmond.”125
The district court’s reasoning is dangerous as far as the Fourth
Amendment is concerned. A primary purpose of deterring gun violence (or
even drive-by shootings) should still fall under the “general interest in
crime control.” If the courts were to sanction all police checkpoints for the
simple fact that they were preventative in nature and sought to “deter rather
than detect” ordinary criminal wrongdoing, then the primary purpose test
would pose little challenge at all. In time, the Fourth Amendment
exceptions would inevitably swallow the rule, given that preventative police
checkpoints would trump the constitutional protections from police
intrusions conducted without suspicion. On appeal, the D.C. Circuit
realized the inherent danger in the district court’s application of the primary
purpose test. The appellate court repudiated the district court’s reasoning,
concluding that if the courts adopted the primary purpose test as envisioned
by Judge Leon, then all preventative police checkpoints would be
sanctioned as long as they proved reasonable.126 The D.C. Circuit was
unwilling to accept the narrow reading of Edmond’s “general interest in
crime control” standard urged by the district court. The appellate court
shared the fear of other courts that such an application of the primary
purpose test could lead to police checkpoints becoming a “routine part of
American life.”127 Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit reversed the case under
Edmond.128

124

Id.
Id.
126
Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills II), 571 F.3d 1304, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
127
See People v. Lidster (Lidster III), 779 N.E.2d 855, 861 (Ill. 2002) (commenting on
the potential for police checkpoints to become routine parts of American life).
128
It must also be noted that the district court’s reliance on the Maxwell case was
misplaced, and it is telling that Judge Leon did not mention this in his opinion. Maxwell was
decided before Edmond in a tribunal that is not binding on the District’s courts. See
Maxwell v. City of New York, 102 F.3d 664 (2d Cir. 1996). In fact, I would argue that
Edmond effectively overturned Maxwell.
The argument can be made that the police checkpoints considered in that case would
today be deemed unconstitutional checkpoints whose primary purpose was to serve the
general interest in crime control. Id. (finding that the checkpoints in Maxwell were utilized
to curtail drive-by shootings and drug trafficking, which presumably fall under the umbrella
of “ordinary criminal wrongdoing” or the “general interest in crime control”).
125
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B. REASONABLENESS OF THE D.C. NEIGHBORHOOD SAFETY ZONES

The district court in Mills held that the circumstances that led to the
implementation of the NSZ were grave, the methods that were used by the
MPD were effective, and the intrusion imposed by the checkpoints on the
District’s drivers was minimal.129 The D.C. Circuit did not address the
reasonableness of the checkpoints after determining that the primary
purpose of the checkpoints was unconstitutional.
Although the district court’s primary purpose analysis was faulty, it is
difficult to argue with the court’s reasonableness analysis under the current
tests available—particularly with regard to the gravity of the public concern
and the effectiveness of the checkpoints. Gun violence is of the highest
concern in Washington, as in other American cities, and during the time in
which the police checkpoints were in effect, there were no reported
incidents of automobile-related gun violence in the area.130
As for the level of intrusion, it was held that the plaintiffs in Mills had
not established a substantial likelihood that the NSZ checkpoints’ intrusion
on individual liberty was so great that it outweighed the interests the NSZ
checkpoints advanced.131 The district court argued that both the objective
and subjective intrusiveness of the checkpoints were minimal and that the
level of discretion afforded the officers conducting the checkpoints was
limited.132 This aspect of the district court’s analysis deserves more
attention and is discussed in the next Part.
IV. THE END OF THE ROAD FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS:
CAUSE FOR CONCERN FOR DRIVERS IN HIGH-CRIME AREAS
Thirty years ago, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that the
expectation of privacy in an automobile and the right to operate an
automobile freely differ from the expectation of privacy and freedom in

Judge Leon did not make this argument. In fact, he cited to the case in persuasive
fashion. See Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (noting that checkpoints, like those in Maxwell,
which were utilized to deter drive-by shootings “served an important public concern,”
similar to the D.C. checkpoints). This was an interesting development, because if Maxwell
continues to be cited as good law, then the legal community must question the continued
viability of the Edmond case as a binding opinion. Maxwell and Edmond arguably cannot
coexist as reliable precedent.
129
Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 59-62.
130
Id. at 59-60.
131
Id. at 62.
132
Id. at 60-62.
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one’s home.133 As a result, Fourth Amendment analysis of searches and
seizures of homes has differed from that of searches and seizures of cars.134
Unfortunately, the idea that a driver should have a “lower” expectation of
privacy while in his car has been exaggerated and exploited. Consequently,
city and police administrators today can develop police checkpoint
programs that, despite being highly intrusive, easily survive judicial
scrutiny. The Fourth Amendment, as it applies to the expectation of
privacy in automobiles, has lost its teeth, and the judicial system must
restore its relevance before it is too late. The following sections touch on
several reasons why the Fourth Amendment’s protections are in danger,
particularly in high-crime areas like the Trinidad neighborhood of
Washington, D.C.
A. THE PRIMARY PURPOSE AND BROWN REASONABLENESS TESTS
ARE DEEPLY FLAWED

The primary purpose and Brown reasonableness tests are deeply
flawed, though courts currently rely on both to determine the
constitutionality of police checkpoints. Moreover, the Supreme Court and
the lower courts inconsistently apply the tests.135 Police checkpoints will
and should continue to be challenged until the Supreme Court develops
better standards or sufficiently outlines the criteria that it considers most
important in judging the constitutionality of police checkpoints. The

133
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 561 (1976) (“[O]ne’s
expectation of privacy in an automobile and of freedom in its operation are significantly
different from the traditional expectation of privacy and freedom in one’s residence.”).
134
See Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 151-53 (1925). Indeed, it can be argued
that this distinction in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence was made far earlier, as the
Supreme Court suggested in Carroll that

the guaranty of freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures by the Fourth Amendment has
been construed, practically since the beginning of the Government, as recognizing a necessary
difference between a search of a store, dwelling house or other structure in respect of which a
proper official warrant readily may be obtained, and a search of a ship, motor boat, wagon or
automobile, for contraband goods, where it is not practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be
sought.

Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
135
See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster (Lidster IV), 540 U.S. 419 (2004); People v. Lidster
(Lidster III), 779 N.E.2d 855 (Ill. 2002). In the Lidster proceedings, the Illinois Appellate
Courts and the U.S. Supreme Court sharply differed on what is considered to be a primary
purpose which serves the “general interest in crime control.” These differences have yet to
be addressed, and the Supreme Court has yet to identify what it considers the “general
interest in crime control.” Consequently, the constitutionality of checkpoints, like those in
D.C., remains difficult to determine.
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following subsections examine the major flaws in both tests as they have
been applied by the courts.
1. The Application of the Primary Purpose Test Is Open to Interpretation
and Therefore Has Been Applied in an Inconsistent Fashion
The primary purpose test created in Edmond has arguably shifted the
focal point in checkpoint litigation. In today’s courts, considerable
deference is shown to city and police officials with regard to the
authorization and operation of police checkpoints. Past Supreme Court
precedent has illustrated that it is almost a foregone conclusion that the
checkpoints will be deemed reasonable.136 Authorized checkpoints are
assumed to address a grave public concern in an effective manner while
only minimally intruding on the civil liberties of the common citizen. As a
result, courts are now focusing more heavily on the government’s purpose
for resorting to checkpoints, as opposed to the manner in which the
checkpoints are conducted.137 This approach is partly the result of the
relative weakness of the Brown reasonableness test.138 Considering this
shift in emphasis, to ensure the rights protected in the Fourth Amendment,
courts must apply a legitimate primary purpose test, and the test’s
fundamental flaws must be addressed.
i. First Flaw: The Edmond Language Has Been Misinterpreted, Leading to
a Shallow, Insufficient Analysis of the Programmatic Purpose of
Challenged Checkpoints
The first major flaw in the primary purpose test as it is currently
applied is a product of the evolution of the test since Edmond. In Edmond,
the Court stated that when a programmatic purpose of the police
checkpoints is to detect “ordinary criminal wrongdoing,” then the
checkpoints are per se unconstitutional.139 That language was strictly

136
See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 53-55 (2000); see also Lidster IV,
540 U.S. at 427-28. In the two major Supreme Court checkpoint cases that have been
decided since the advent of the primary purpose test, the Court has dedicated the majority of
its opinions to the discussion of the checkpoint programs’ primary purpose. In Edmond,
where the checkpoint program was struck down, the dissenting Justices of the Supreme
Court indicated that the checkpoint program was clearly reasonable and thus constitutional.
They saw the primary purpose test as a tool which would be utilized by lower courts to strike
down police checkpoints which would clearly be reasonable and thus constitutional under
Brown.
137
See generally, e.g., Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d 47 (D.D.C. 2008).
138
For further discussion of the Brown reasonableness test, see infra Part IV.A.2.
139
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42.
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construed by Judge Leon.140 Consequently, minor linguistic manipulation
of the documents that authorize a checkpoint program by law enforcement
officials create police checkpoints that survive judicial scrutiny.141 More
specifically, if the programmatic documents specify that the checkpoints are
to “deter” criminal wrongdoing or to “gather” information regarding a
crime rather than to “detect” wrongdoing, then the programmatic purpose is
justifiable under Judge Leon’s version of the test.142
The key to passing the test, however, should not be whether the
primary purpose of a system of police checkpoints is deterrence rather than
detection of criminal wrongdoing. Fortunately, the D.C. Circuit recognized
this flaw in the district court’s reasoning.143 The fundamental rights
provided by the Fourth Amendment should not be so easily overcome by a
play on words by a clever legislator. This is not to say that a police
checkpoint that serves as a deterrent should be presumptively
unconstitutional. Both border checkpoints and sobriety checkpoints
arguably have as major goals the prevention of drunk driving and illegal
immigration, respectively.144 Yet, courts must dig deeper than the
legislative language of the authorizing documents when attempting to
decipher the programmatic purpose of the checkpoint program.
ii. The Second Flaw: The Supreme Court Has Failed to Articulate Which
Police Objectives Fall Under the “General Interest in Crime Control”
Umbrella
The second major flaw in the primary purpose test stems from the
Supreme Court’s failure to indicate what comes under the umbrella of the
“general interest in crime control.” Given the outcome in Edmond, we can
be assured that the detection of drug trafficking is considered by several
140

See Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 57 (holding that the D.C. checkpoints can be
distinguished from those prohibited under Edmond because their primary purpose is not to
make arrests or to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, but rather to deter
persons in motor vehicles from entering the NSZ to commit crime).
141
Id.
142
See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster (Lidster IV), 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004); Mills I, 584 F.
Supp. 2d at 57-58. Both of these cases illustrate the weakness of the primary purpose test.
The courts in each case placed far too much emphasis on the language of the documents
which authorized the checkpoints in determining the “primary purpose” of the checkpoints.
The danger of relying on this authorizing language is that courts will be easily manipulated
in the future, as the authorizing language may state that the purpose is to “gather
information” when the underlying purpose is to, in fact, detect ordinary criminal
wrongdoing.
143
Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills II), 571 F.3d 1304, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
144
See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 449 (1990) (noting the
importance of deterring drunk driving); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 55556 (1976) (noting the importance of deterring illegal immigration).
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Justices to be a “general crime control” objective, but we can be assured of
little else.145 This is a flaw that must be cured in order to ensure that city
officials only resort to the authorization of police checkpoints when a
special governmental interest is identified.
In Edmond, Justice O’Connor argued that, despite the “severe and
intractable nature of the drug problem,” the Indianapolis checkpoints were
not justifiable.146 She understood the checkpoints to be simply a tool for
police to “pursue their general crime control ends” in a fashion which did
not pass constitutional muster.147 Yet, she did not indicate any other
checkpoint objectives that might be classified as impermissible “general
crime control” law enforcement techniques.
In Mills, the district court made a point of arguing that the phrase
“general interest in crime control” does not refer to every law enforcement
objective.148 Consequently, the court concluded that the phrase did not
encompass the specific deterrence of automobile-related gun violence
encountered in the nation’s capital.149 Of course, the D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals disagreed with Judge Leon’s district court opinion, holding that the
D.C. checkpoint’s primary purpose was to pursue the general interest in
crime control.
Given the ambiguity surrounding the phrase “general interest in crime
control,” it remains unclear whether the district court or the appellate court
properly interpreted the Supreme Court’s views regarding justifiable
primary purposes for checkpoint programs.150 It is clear, however, that if
the Supreme Court were to provide categories of impermissible police
checkpoint justifications or a list of justifications that would come under the
heading of “general interest in crime control,” the Court would go a long
way towards resolving this question. The lack of clarity in determining
what is considered the “general interest in crime control” will undoubtedly
continue to be a problem in checkpoint litigation until the Supreme Court
attempts to resolve it.
iii. Third Flaw: The Primary Purpose Can Be Deceiving and Difficult to
Decipher
The primary purpose examination has a third flaw: police departments
may erect roadblocks under the guise of conducting sobriety checkpoints, or

145
146
147
148
149
150

See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40 (2000).
Id. at 42.
Id. at 43.
Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 57 (D.D.C. 2008).
Id.
See Mills II, 571 F.3d 1304, 1311 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
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gathering information regarding past activities, or even simply deterring
gun violence, when the true underlying mission of the checkpoints is to
detect other criminal activity. While this statement illustrates an undeniably
cynical view, how are the courts supposed to be able to decipher the actual
purpose of the checkpoints?
Take, for example, the NSZ checkpoints. The appellate court chose to
overturn the district court’s opinion on the grounds that the programmatic
purpose of the checkpoints was too closely related to “general crime
control.”151 Under the primary purpose test, as it is currently applied, the
issuance of a revised Special Order with several linguistic changes would
allow the checkpoints to pass constitutional muster. For instance, the
checkpoints could be tied to roadway safety or traffic regulation instead of
the deterrence of gun violence. In Mills, the D.C. Circuit noted that while
deterrence of drug activity and gun violence are forbidden primary purposes
under Edmond, traffic regulation remains a permissible primary purpose for
suspicionless checkpoints.152
It is only a matter of time before city officials facing rising crime rates
attempt to authorize checkpoint plans under deceptive guises that might
persuade the courts to deem the checkpoints constitutional. Indeed, given
the level of violent crime involving the use of automobiles in Washington,
D.C., it would be difficult to make the argument that the sobriety
checkpoints in Sitz are more justifiable in eliminating the “immediate,
vehicle-bound threat to life and limb” than any D.C. checkpoints aimed at
roadway safety.153 This emphasis on the legislative language of checkpoint
plans—language which can easily be manipulated by legislators to “pass”
the Supreme Court’s test—places Fourth Amendment in danger.
iv. What the Supreme Court Can Do to Save the Primary Purpose Test
The Supreme Court must clarify the parameters of the primary purpose
test if it is to be relied upon in future checkpoint litigation. If the Court
does so, perhaps the test will be applied by lower courts so that only certain
special governmental needs, which are distinguishable from the general
interest in crime control, justify police checkpoints. Justice O’Connor
noted that she was unwilling to identify a bright-line rule or “rigid
categories” that would limit the types of crimes that would justify

151

Id. at 1312.
Id.
153
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 39, 43 (2000) (noting that Sitz sobriety
checks were “aimed at reducing the immediate hazard posed by the presence of drunk
drivers on the highways and there was an obvious connection between the imperative of
highway safety and the law enforcement practice at issue”).
152
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reasonable police checkpoints.154 She noted that the Fourth Amendment
would permit an “appropriately tailored roadblock set up to thwart an
imminent terrorist attack or to catch a dangerous criminal who is likely to
flee by way of a particular route.”155 This Comment does not deny that
these considerations are valid. It does argue, however, that the Court
should be more transparent with respect to which checkpoint justifications
are not sufficient under the test or are too closely linked to the general
interest in crime control. Given the way that the doctrine has evolved since
Edmond and the manner in which lower courts have applied the test, it may
be time to rethink Justice O’Connor’s reluctance to specify certain
categories of criminal activity that are indistinguishable from the general
interest in crime control.
2. The Increasingly Low Threshold to Pass the Brown
Reasonableness Test Must Be Addressed
Although the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals chose not to address the
reasonableness of the NSZ checkpoints after determining that the primary
purpose of the program was unconstitutional, courts in most checkpoint
cases use the Brown reasonableness test after determining that the primary
purpose is justified.156 “The reasonableness of seizures at vehicle
checkpoints” under Brown is assessed by weighing: “1) the gravity of the
public concern served by the checkpoints; 2) the degree to which the
checkpoints advance the public interest; and 3) the severity of the
checkpoints’ interference with individual liberty.”157 The test is inherently
flawed because it undervalues individual liberty interests when balancing
such interests against the public interest goal. The test, as it is currently
applied, does not sufficiently protect Fourth Amendment rights.
Courts have maintained that the gravity of the public concern may
reduce an individual’s liberty interest, but that “the gravity of the threat
alone [is not] dispositive of questions concerning what means law
enforcement officers may employ to pursue a given purpose.”158 Despite
this proclamation, when government officials have provided a rational
reason for instituting police checkpoints and adequately warned drivers
about the checkpoints, the checkpoints have survived the Brown
reasonableness test. The test has a very low threshold—an assertion
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Id. at 44.
Id.
156
See, e.g., Illinois v. Lidster (Lidster IV), 540 U.S. 419, 426 (2004); Mich. Dep’t of
State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 455 (1990).
157
Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 59 (D.D.C. 2008).
158
Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
155
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supported by the government’s high success rate in proving the
reasonableness of intrusive checkpoints in the thirty years since Brown.159
The following discussion highlights the flaws in the Brown
reasonableness test, with a special focus on the problems associated with
the “effectiveness” and “intrusiveness” prongs of the test. This discussion
also examines how courts assess the reasonableness of police checkpoints
used in high-crime areas like Trinidad.
i. Gravity of Public Concern
The first factor considered under the Brown test is the gravity of the
public concern that has led to the authorization of challenged checkpoints.
The manner in which courts have assessed the gravity of public concern is
straightforward and uncontroversial. After all, it would be nonsensical to
argue that the issues of border control, drunk driving, narcotics trafficking,
or gun violence are not grave public concerns. Not surprisingly, the
Supreme Court has yet to hold that the gravity of the public concern
motivating a challenged checkpoint was insufficient under the Brown
test.160 More troubling, the Court has never described in detail what
constitutes a “grave public concern.” Consequently, lower courts have
nowhere to turn for guidance in judging whether the gravity of public
concern is sufficient under the Brown test.
In considering how a court might examine a high-crime area
checkpoint, it is a near certainty that the criminal activity that is prevalent in
most urban areas would be considered a grave public concern (including
gun violence, gang violence, drug trafficking, and prostitution).
Accordingly, given past Court precedent, the more controversial
“effectiveness” and “intrusiveness” aspects of the Brown test will be the
subject of far more scrutiny.
ii. Effectiveness
The second factor considered under the Brown reasonableness test is
the effectiveness of the checkpoints. In considering the effectiveness of
police checkpoints, courts have concluded that while statistical evidence
can often be instructive, it is not required to establish a checkpoint’s

159

See 443 U.S. 47 (1979). The police checkpoint cases that have come before the
Supreme Court since Brown have ended with the Court considering the checkpoints
reasonable, with the exception being Edmond, where the Brown test was not applied. Lidster
IV, 540 U.S. at 426; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 455.
160
See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 49 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (concluding that
Indianapolis’s determination that checkpoints utilized to stop drug trafficking was a
legitimate state interest and satisfied the first part of the Brown test).
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effectiveness.161 As Judge Leon wrote in Mills, “no single type of evidence
is a touchstone for determining whether a checkpoint is ‘effective.’”162
When accused of setting up an ineffective checkpoint, the government
must simply prove that the method chosen is a reasonable law enforcement
technique and that it furthers the public’s interest in a “sufficiently
productive” manner.163 As a result of this low bar, every police checkpoint
to which the Court has applied the Brown test has been deemed
“effective.”164 The Supreme Court has made clear that judges are not able
to decide the best means to advance the public interest identified; instead,
considerable deference must be accorded to “the government officials who
have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public
resources.”165
Thus, despite a fundamental right being at stake, the courts are not
allowed to stop checkpoints solely on the grounds that, statistically, they
prove ineffective. As long as the checkpoints are reasonably tailored to
advance the program’s purpose, and as long as the checkpoints are
“sufficiently” productive (although it is not necessarily up to the presiding
judge to determine what is considered “productive”) then the checkpoints
pass muster under the “effectiveness” test.
Judges should be given more credit. Although showing deference to
government officials is understandable, if the statistical analysis illustrates
that a checkpoint has failed to limit illegal border crossings, drunk driving,
or violent crime in a high-crime area, then a judge should be able to make
the determination that the checkpoint is ineffective. At the moment, the test
requires far too much deference, and the Supreme Court should rectify this
flaw in the analysis in its next police checkpoint case.
Notably, even within the D.C. police hierarchy, some dispute the
effectiveness of high profile police checkpoints in high-crime areas, such as
those which surrounded Trinidad.166 Kris Baumann, head of the D.C.
Fraternal Order of Police, argued that the NSZ program would ultimately
“make policing more difficult by harming the trust between officers and
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Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 59-60 (citing United States v. Bowman, 496 F.3d 685, 693
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (“[T]he effectiveness or expected effectiveness of the checkpoint . . . may
be demonstrated in a variety of ways.”)).
162
Id. at 60.
163
Id. at 59 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S at 453-54).
164
See, e.g., Lidster IV, 540 U.S. at 419; Sitz, 496 U.S. at 444; United States v. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
165
Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 59 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 454).
166
See David Nakamura, Police Union Chief: Checkpoints Not Effective, WASH. POST,
June 10, 2008, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/dc/2008/06/police_union_chief_check
points.html.
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city residents.”167 He noted that, as far as making arrests, the NSZ program
had “limited or no effectiveness” and worried that the checkpoints were
“destroying the relations with citizens.”168 In addition, he added that he was
“getting a lot of calls from officers who [were] concerned that [the
checkpoint program was] not [c]onstitutional.”169
This Comment argues that, if this test is to be applied in the future, indepth statistical analysis of the effectiveness of checkpoints like those used
in the D.C. NSZ should be included in the record and noted in future
opinions. In addition, the effect that the checkpoints have on policeresident relations should be taken into account. These steps would solidify
the justification for authorizing checkpoints. They would also provide
judges with reliable benchmarks to compare the effectiveness of police
checkpoints in the future. At the moment, there is no comparison, and there
is no true scrutiny of the statistical or societal effectiveness of checkpoints.
As it stands, the effectiveness element of the Brown reasonableness test is
itself ineffective.
iii. Intrusiveness
The final factor in the Brown reasonableness test is the analysis of the
intrusiveness of the police checkpoints. To determine the severity of the
checkpoint program’s intrusiveness, three criteria are generally considered:
(1) the “objective” intrusiveness of the checkpoints; (2) the “subjective”
intrusiveness of the checkpoints; and (3) the level of discretion afforded the
police officers conducting the checkpoints.170 These three elements of the
“intrusiveness” prong of the Brown test are examined in detail in the
following discussion, which focuses particularly on the flaws in the
“intrusiveness” analysis in Mills, and how the “intrusiveness” analysis
might be conducted in future cases involving checkpoints surrounding highcrime neighborhoods.
a. Objective Intrusiveness
A checkpoint’s objective intrusion is “measured by the duration of the
seizure and the intensity of the investigation.”171 The objective intrusion
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Id.
Id.
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See Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452; Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452.
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analysis has typically only examined the intrusiveness of each individual
stop, not the overall length of the checkpoint program.172
The district court’s opinion in Mills illustrates a major flaw in the
“objective intrusiveness” test, particularly when the test is applied to
checkpoints surrounding a high-crime neighborhood.173 Checkpoints
surrounding one’s neighborhood present a different set of issues than those
that have been previously validated by the Supreme Court.
The
checkpoints that the Supreme Court has authorized are generally of the type
that one rarely encounters; no one anticipates that drivers are frequently
crossing the border or being stopped at sobriety checkpoints.174 This likely
contributes to the Supreme Court’s assumption that the checkpoints are
minimally intrusive. But checkpoints at the border and on highways can be
avoided with knowledge of the checkpoints in a manner that contrasts
starkly from those that confine a residential neighborhood.
The D.C. checkpoints were authorized twice in one month.175 The
second time they were authorized, the Chief of Police approved an
extension of the checkpoints for up to ten days.176 This would presumably
lead to the seizure of one’s vehicle multiple times over a period of days, as
one returned home from work, errands, leisure activity, or visits with family
and friends outside the neighborhood. The objective intrusiveness is far
greater when citizens are being stopped and questioned by the police
repeatedly. This is undoubtedly more intrusive police checkpoint behavior
than has previously been sanctioned by the Supreme Court, and it should be
treated as such in the future.
b. Subjective Intrusiveness
The second factor considered, the “subjective” intrusiveness of the
checkpoints, is easily satisfied. The courts require that those administering
police checkpoints make an effort to “minimize anxiety, alarm, and fear.”177
Minimal efforts to ensure that checkpoints are publicized, such as putting
172
See Illinois v. Lidster (Lidster IV), 540 U.S. 419 (2004); Sitz, 496 U.S. 444; United
States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976); see also Mills v. District of Columbia
(Mills I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 61 (D.D.C. 2008). In the three major Supreme Court police
checkpoint cases, the Court examined the intrusiveness of each individual stop in detail, but
not the overall length of the checkpoint program. Not surprisingly, Judge Leon followed the
same formula in Mills I.
173
Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 61.
174
See Sitz, 496 U.S. 444; Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543.
175
Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 53.
176
Id.
177
Id. at 61 (citing Sitz, 496 U.S. at 452). In Sitz, the Supreme Court noted that the
potential for “fear and surprise” is minimal where uniformed police officers stopped every
car.
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up posters warning motorists approaching the checkpoints that stops are
imminent or announcing the checkpoints at a news conference, have led
courts to label checkpoints as minimally intrusive.178 When checkpoints
stop all passing motorists for inspection, rather than picking cars at random,
courts also tend to see the stops as minimally intrusive in a subjective
sense.179 Again, these requirements constitute an incredibly low bar for the
administrators of police checkpoints to overcome.
The “subjective intrusiveness” analysis is particularly flawed as
applied to checkpoints in high-crime neighborhoods. The analysis by Judge
Leon of the subjective intrusiveness of the D.C. checkpoints, in which he
strictly applied tests used by higher courts, illustrates these flaws. Judge
Leon concluded that the “subjective intrusiveness” of the D.C. checkpoints
was minimal.180 He noted that the checkpoints in D.C. were publicized,
posters were put up that warned motorists approaching the checkpoints that
a stop was imminent, and all motorists who chose to proceed to the
checkpoint were stopped.181 He affirmed that these were the kinds of steps
that the Supreme Court had held minimized anxiety, alarm, and fear.182
In high-crime neighborhoods, however, the relationship between the
police and the neighborhood’s residents may be tense.183 While some are
heartened at the sight of the police, others are instilled with a sense of anger
and fear, particularly those who have been previously apprehended or who
know someone who has been arrested or mistreated by the police.184
Consequently, it is more likely that in a high-crime neighborhood, the sight
of an increased police presence might increase the level of alarm and
anxiety one feels as a driver, despite not having committed a crime. As a
result, courts should engage in more cogent analysis with regard to which
police efforts realistically “minimize anxiety, alarm and fear” when
checkpoints are authorized in high-crime areas.
c. Police Discretion
The third consideration of the intrusiveness test is the level of
discretion given to the police officers conducting the checkpoints.
178

See United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306, 1313 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (holding that
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Reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be
carried out pursuant to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the
conduct of individual officers.185 Courts consider whether officers manning
checkpoints have been given specific instructions and training. If their
instructions are detailed in a reasonable fashion and the officers have been
sufficiently trained, then the discretionary standard poses little threat to the
constitutionality of a checkpoint.
While the aforementioned limitations on police officers are important
and well-stated, the potential for abuse of the discretion afforded police
officers remains extremely high at checkpoints, regardless of the level of
training and instruction provided. Giving police officers license to stop
every driver on the road, without the driver’s consent or an articulated
reason for suspicion, can lead to friction between driver and officer.
In high-crime areas like Trinidad, police officers manning checkpoints
are granted the discretion to arrest when they believe that the drivers are not
complying with their requests.186 Even with careful instructions, there is
clearly a danger of abuse of discretion, particularly because the checkpoints
are located in an area where residents and police often already coexist in a
state of distrust.187
In Mills, the district court stated that the NSZ checkpoint program was
drafted “to minimize the discretion vested with the officers implementing
the program.”188 The court noted that the Special Orders provided a
“highly-detailed set of rules” that governed the officers staffing the
checkpoints.189 The district court also found it persuasive that all of the
officers were required to complete a training session on the checkpoint
program before they were allowed to staff a checkpoint.190
In passing, the district court added that the one instance in which an
officer retained significant discretion was when an operator’s stated reason
for entry fell “within an ambiguity in the list of ‘legitimate reasons’ for
entry.”191 This, however, is the moment where an abuse of discretion is the
most likely to occur. The driver’s chances of entry are completely subject

185
See Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979); see also Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S.
648, 661 (1979) (finding system of vehicle spot checks unconstitutional on account of
“standardless and unconstrained discretion” afforded police officers).
186
See Mills v. District of Columbia (Mills I), 584 F. Supp. 2d 47, 51 (D.D.C. 2008).
187
See Keith L. Alexander & V. Dion Haynes, Police Call ID Checks in Trinidad a
Success: Stopping Drivers a Violation of Rights, Some Neighbors Say, WASH. POST, June 8,
2008, at C1.
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Mills I, 584 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
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to the police officer’s discretion. A law-abiding citizen, in a moment of
panic, might not provide the answer the police officer is looking for and, as
a result, be denied entry into his neighborhood. In fact, he might provide a
perfectly suitable answer and still be denied entry. These checkpoint
programs place far too much power in the hands of the police at the expense
of citizens, in contravention of the Fourth Amendment. The danger of this
abuse of discretion should carry more weight in future police checkpoint
cases if the Brown reasonableness test is to be relied upon.
B. A NEW STRICT SCRUTINY TEST IS NEEDED

As the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals concluded in Mills, instituting
police checkpoints due to a rise in crime is generally not a concept that can
be reconciled with the Fourth Amendment.192 The Supreme Court has been
quite clear that it is willing to carve out exceptions to the rules that uphold
the protections of the Fourth Amendment, but it has only done so when it
finds a primary purpose that can be identified as a “special governmental
need.”193 All governmental needs, however, cannot be treated equally when
a fundamental right of citizens under the Constitution is at stake.
Therefore, a new test is needed which will ensure that only those police
checkpoints that are narrowly tailored to pursue a compelling governmental
interest are authorized.
1. Strict Scrutiny Review
When police are authorized to conduct “seizures” at checkpoints
without individualized suspicion or consent, the checkpoints should be
subjected to strict scrutiny. Just as “strict scrutiny” tests are applied to
protect the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights of citizens, the Fourth
Amendment rights of drivers should be similarly protected by a test which
strictly scrutinizes a severe burden on citizens’ fundamental rights.194 The
burden imposed by police checkpoints should be considered per se severe.
Police officers who operate checkpoints are authorized to stop motorists
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without individualized suspicion, and the Fourth Amendment specifically
forbids this type of burdensome, intrusive behavior.195
Strict scrutiny review makes sense for two major reasons. First, this
type of review is commonly used by judges and its application in other
contexts has been consistent and reliable.196 The tests currently in place to
determine the constitutionality of checkpoints have been applied in an
inconsistent fashion that must not be condoned. Second, courts are
currently applying what in reality is a “rational review” analysis, in the
form of the two-part primary purpose and Brown reasonableness tests. This
approach, as the discussion in Part IV has illustrated, does not provide the
scrutiny necessary to properly protect the fundamental rights guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment. A strict scrutiny test would have the necessary
teeth to protect the fundamental Fourth Amendment rights guaranteed to
American citizens (even while driving).
2. Would the D.C. Checkpoints Survive Strict Scrutiny?
It is unlikely that the NSZ checkpoints would prove constitutional
under a strict scrutiny review, although other high-crime area checkpoints
might survive. Under a strict scrutiny review, the first step that D.C.
officials would have the burden of proving is that the NSZ checkpoints
were authorized to pursue a compelling governmental interest. City
officials could go with a broad or narrow argument or something in
between. Broadly, officials could argue that the compelling governmental
interest at stake is keeping the District’s at-risk neighborhoods safe from
crime. Yet, if this interest was accepted as compelling, such a decision
would force the courts to accept almost all law enforcement objectives as
“compelling” governmental interests.
Alternatively, the government could, and likely would, argue that the
compelling interest is a far narrower one: reducing the number of gunrelated deaths in a high-crime area, for example. The Court could find that
this interest is also too general, or too closely tied to the “general interest”
in crime control, to be considered a compelling interest. On the other hand,
it is conceivable that a court might consider the reduction of gun violence in
a high-crime area a compelling governmental interest, and if so, the Court
would be forced to move to the second prong of the test.

195
See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . . .”).
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See Adam Winkler, Fatal in Theory and Strict in Fact: An Empirical Analysis of
Strict Scrutiny in the Federal Courts, 59 VAND. L. REV. 793, 815 (2006).
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The second element of a strict scrutiny review would require the
government to illustrate how the checkpoints were narrowly tailored to
pursue the compelling governmental interest. It is here that the NSZ
checkpoint program is fatally flawed under a strict scrutiny review.
Regardless of the compelling interest put forward by the government, the
checkpoints were not narrowly tailored in a manner that should pass
constitutional muster under strict scrutiny review.
There are two major reasons for this argument. First, the checkpoints
were over-inclusive, authorizing seizures on every citizen who happens to
live in the designated high-crime area.197 Strict scrutiny review would
demand that the checkpoints have more focus and likely require a higher
level of individualized suspicion. A program which condones random stops
of innocent civilians in order to pursue a compelling governmental interest
(here, ostensibly to prevent gun violence) is, quite simply, not narrowly
tailored.
Second, far less intrusive options are available to law enforcement.
There are other ways to pursue “routine investigative work that the police
must do every day.”198
Interim D.C. Attorney General Nickles
acknowledged that city officials had attempted to attack the gun violence
problem in a variety of less intrusive manners with limited or no success.199
This acknowledgment, that the city was aware of other available techniques
that were less intrusive and consistent with the Constitution, would prove
fatal under the strict scrutiny review.
Accordingly, under a responsible strict scrutiny test, the NSZ
checkpoints, and other high-crime area checkpoints fashioned after those
authorized in the District during the summer of 2008, would not survive
judicial review. With that said, one can imagine a checkpoint program that
survives this type of review. It would, however, have to operate in a
fashion that is less intrusive on innocent civilians and be authorized only
after a determination that no other reasonable alternatives are available.
Checkpoints should be held to such a standard, in order to ensure the Fourth
Amendment rights of all citizens, regardless of where they live or drive.
V. CONCLUSION
The Court’s lack of effective guidance poses a substantial risk to the
protections guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment. In Lidster, the Court
argued that practical considerations would limit just how extensively police
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checkpoints would be utilized in the future.200 In the opinion, Justice
Breyer noted that there was no real threat that police checkpoints would
become a routine part of American life.201 Yet, in the wake of Lidster and
Judge Leon’s opinion in Mills, the District of Columbia had the power to
surround every neighborhood in the nation’s capital with an intrusive police
barricade in a manner that ran completely contrary to the Framers’ vision of
privacy.202 The Supreme Court must realize that its past errors in the realm
of police checkpoint jurisprudence will proliferate as more cities introduce
intrusive checkpoints in the face of rising crime. It is the duty of the
Supreme Court to ensure that the Fourth Amendment rights of citizens are
not violated. Without a change in direction by the Court, these rights are at
risk of disappearing.
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